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TO SKIN A CAT: QUI TAM ACTIONS AS A STATE
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO CONCEPCION
Janet Cooper Alexander*
The Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion is widely regarded as heralding the
demise of small-claims class actions whenever contracts of adhesion are involved in
the transaction-which means for virtually all consumer and employment claims.
Amending the Federal Arbitration Act to overturn Concepcion would be a rela-
tively simple exercise in legislative drafting, but in the current political climate such
efforts are unlikely to succeed. Thus far, proposed federal corrective legislation has
failed to pass, and federal agency regulation of class waivers has been lacking.
State legislatures might have the political ability to pass corrective legislation, but
virtually all state limitations on class waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses are
foreclosed by federal preemption under Concepcion.
This Article proposes an alternative approach that could be taken at the state level:
statutory qui tam actions to enforce civil penalties for violations of state consumer
protection and employment laws. A qui tam action is a representative action
brought on behalf of the state, to enforce the state's claim for civil penalties, rather
than a class action to recover compensation for individual injuries. The penalties
are owed to the state, with a share of the recovery payable to the plaintiff as an
incentive to private enforcement. The action is for the public benefit, for the law
enforcement purpose of ensuring compliance with state law, rather than for private
benefit. Thus, the rationale 0f Concepcion simply does not apply to such actions.
Indeed, allowing private parties to contract away the state legislature's chosen
means of enforcing claims that belong to the state would seriously impair the state's
ability to execute core governmental functions. It would be an intrusion into state
sovereignty that should give pause to neo-federalists such as the majority in
Concepcion.
California's Private Attorneys General Act (PA GA), which provides a mechanism
for private enforcement of civil penalties for violation of the state labor code, is an
example of how a state might use the qui tam model to hold defendants accounta-
ble for mass harms without being vulnerable to FAA preemption under
Concepcion. After describing the operation of PAGA and how courts have inter-
preted it, I propose some simple adjustments that would increase the likelihood that
courts would find Concepcion inapplicable to a PAGA-style qui tam statute.
Qui tam actions are not a perfect substitute for class actions, because they can
provide only limited compensation to victims. But they may partially fill the deter-
rence gap that Concepcion is widely expected to create.
* Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to
Christopher Brumwell, who first alerted me to the California Private Attorneys General Act
and its relevance to the Concepcion problem, and to Andrew Noll and Daniel Corbett for their
invaluable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
AT&TMobility v. Concepcion1 is the latest and most expansive step
in the Supreme Court's ongoing project of transforming the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA), 2  a statute passed to forbid
discrimination against arbitration, into a virtually irrebuttable fed-
eral preference for arbitration that displaces states' power to
develop generally applicable contract law regarding contracts of ad-
hesion. After Concepcion, if a party with power to dictate the terms of
a contract chooses to eliminate access to courts or to aggregative
proceedings, states are essentially powerless to protect the other
party through substantive rules of contract law such as the doctrine
of unconscionability-even when those rules are equally applicable
to litigation and arbitration. The decision affects "virtually every ar-
bitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction, "3 and
"permits most of the companies that touch consumers' day-to-day
lives to place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by
simply incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form
contracts. ' 4 It may lead to the virtual death of the class action in
employment cases and consumer contracts involving the sale of
goods and services-any small-dollar transaction that can be gov-
erned by shrinkwrap, clickwrap, claim check, or other form
contract. The decision is all the more remarkable because the Jus-
tices who comprised the majority profess to be strong advocates of
federalism and defenders of state autonomy.5 Concepcion demon-
strates that for these Justices, a disdain for consumer class action
1. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2006).
3. Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility and FAA Over-Preemption, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 25,
26 (2012).
4. Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to Vindication of
Rights, SCOTUSBLoG (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-
concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights. A pre-Concepcion empirical study
published in this Journal revealed that 75 percent of the studied consumer contracts con-
tained arbitration clauses, and all of those contained class waivers. Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Noncon-
sumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882-84 (2008). The desire to obtain immunity
from litigation is illustrated by Professor Sternlight's anecdote about a Whataburger
franchise in East Texas that had, before the Concepcion decision, posted a sign on the door
saying that by entering customers agreed to arbitrate "any and all disputes ... which arise
from the products, services, or premises."Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 719 (2012).
5. Justice Breyer in dissent pointedly observed that the majority's decision "do[es] not
honor federalist principles." Concepcion, 131 S. Ct at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[F]ederalism is as much a question of deeds as words. It often takes the form of a concrete
decision by this Court that respects the legitimacy of a State's action in an individual case.
Here, recognition of th[e] federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular
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litigation and individuals' access to courts outweighs any commit-
ment to federalism and state autonomy. 6
Recent scholarship has established that Concepcion fundamentally
misreads the original purpose and design of the FAA.7 The enact-
ing Congress never intended the FAA to have the expansive reach
the Supreme Court has recently fashioned for it. The statute was
passed to address the problem of discrimination against bargained-
for arbitration agreements between merchants having roughly
equal bargaining power.8 It was not intended to apply to employ-
ment contracts or contracts of adhesion.9 It expressed no hostility
to class actions or aggregative procedures, for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were not even promulgated until over a decade af-
ter the FAA's enactment, and the modern class action did not arise
until a full four decades later.10 The FAA's "overarching purpose"
was not to create a federal preference for arbitration to "facilitate
streamlined proceedings,"11 as Concepcion asserts, but to prohibit
statute, should lead us to uphold California's law, not to strike it down. We do not honor
federalist principles in their breach."). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States Whien It
Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1313, 1315, 1328 (2004) (noting
that justices who profess "concern for states' rights or the application of a neutral methodol-
ogy... [i]nstead ... reflect traditional conservative value choices to limit civil rights and to
protect business.").
6. The Court will shortly decide what, if anything, is left of the "effective vindication
doctrine" in cases involving federal statutory rights. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (Justice Sotomayor, who was a
member of the Second Circuit panel before her elevation to the Supreme Court, has recused
herself). See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (noting that "it
may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in an arbitral forum" but holding such a
claim was not demonstrated in the record); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (permitting arbitration "so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum"). The
Court may also further limit the availability of classwide arbitration in Oxford Health Plans LLC
v. Sutter, 675 F.3d 215 (3d. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), in which the defen-
dant challenges the arbitrator's decision that class arbitration was permitted.
7. See Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us
About Law-making, 44 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 399-407 (2012); see generally, Hiro N. Aragaki,
Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1189 (2011) (advancing an argument that
the FAA should be read as an anti-discrimination statute preventing non-enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements). For a classic study of the purposes of the FAA, see Katherine V.W.
Stone, RusticJustice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N. CAR. L. REV.
991 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 7, at 396.
9. Id. at 396-99 (describing in detail legislative history and statutory provisions dis-
claiming application to employment contracts and contracts of adhesion).
10. The FAA was enacted in 1925. The Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, and
Rule 23 in its modern form was adopted in 1966.
11. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
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discrimination against parties' mutual agreement to arbitrate.' 2 The
Court's recent cases have ignored the FAA's history and structure
3
and have used the statute as a tool to advance an agenda that is
hostile to consumer litigation and classwide procedures.
14
Moreover, Concepcion is based on a mythologized view of arbitra-
tion as a simple, bilateral proceeding that is fundamentally
inconsistent with and unable to accommodate both high-stakes,
complex procedures and the sorts of legal issues that arise in class
proceedings. This view of arbitration is seriously out of date. Arbi-
tration is often used to resolve complex commercial disputes,
including international disputes, in which hundreds of millions of
dollars may be at stake. 15 Arbitration proceedings to resolve IBM's
claims against Fujistu for unauthorized use of IBM's software code,
for example, extended for over a decade and resulted in payments
of over $800 million.' 6 Arbitration proceedings can be very simple
7
or stunningly complex.' 8 The organization that bills itself as the
12. See Wasserman, supra note 7 at 395-96; Stone, supra note 7 at 942 ("[T]he FAA was
intended to facilitate self-regulation within commercial communities, not to regulate rela-
tionships between consumers and large corporations in arm's length, anonymous
transactions"). See generally id at 969-91 (discussing the history of arbitration and the FAA).
13. This criticism has been made by dissenting justices as well as commentators. See, e.g.,
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (the enacting Congress's assumption
that arbitration would be used in disputes between merchants of roughly equal bargaining
power suggests "that California's statute is consistent with, and indeed may help to further,
the objectives that Congress had in mind.").
14. See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 401 ("In just the last two years, the Court has contin-
ued to substitute its policy preferences for Congress's, reading into the FAA its current
skepticism about class actions and collective litigation, notwithstanding a complete dearth of
evidence that Congress intended to mandate enforcement of class action waivers.").
15. Justice Breyer's dissent in Concepcion lists several notable arbitrations resulting in
awards of hundreds of millions of dollars. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760.
16. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, I.B.M. and Fujitsu Agree to End Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/12/business/ibm-and-fujitsu-agree-to-end-ar-
bitration.html. After a settlement in IBM's 1982 suit against Fujitsu fell apart, the parties
agreed to arbitration. The arbitrators reached a resolution quickly (in twenty-six months) for
a dispute of such complexity. The resolution provided for an initial payment of $237 million
and continued annual arbitration proceedings until 2002 to govern Fujitsu's access to IBM's
code. Fujitsu to Pay Big Premium for IBM Data: Arbitrators Resolve '82 Suit; Cost Put in Hundreds of
Millions, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-29/news/mn-
693_1_ibm-mainframe. The parties agreed to terminate the arbitration panel in 1997 be-
cause Fujitsu no longer desired access to the code. Pollack, supra. For an overview of the IBM-
Fujitsu arbitration, see generally Robert H. Mnookin &Jonathan D. Greenberg, Lessons of the
IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration: How Disputants Can Work Together to Solve Deeper Conflicts, 4 DisP. RESOL.
MAG. 16 (1997-98) (Mnookin was one of the two arbitrators).
17. See, e.g., Simplified Arbitrations, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMedia-
tion/Arbitration/SpecialProcedures/SimplifiedArbitrations/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2013); Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 Sw. L. REv. 47,
64-69 (2012).
18. See, e.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. Fujitsu Ltd., Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
Commercial Arbitration Tribunal, Case No. 13-T-117-0636-85 (1987) (Mnookin & Jones,
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largest private alternative dispute resolution provider in the world
has a large number of arbitrators who, as retired federal and state
judges, are intimately familiar with class action procedures. 19 And
the major arbitration organizations have extensive written rules and
procedures for classwide arbitrations and have been conducting
classwide arbitrations for years. The California Supreme Court's de-
cision in Discover Bank itself characterized classwide arbitration as
"well accepted under California law," 20 and the Concepcion majority
noted that the American Arbitration Association had opened 283
classwide arbitrations as of September 2009.21 Nevertheless, the
Court found that the California rule at issue in the case, though
facially applicable to both litigation and arbitration, in practice dis-
favored arbitration because "[r] equiring the availability of classwide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration"-
that is, "its informality"22 -"and thus creates a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA.
'23
Classwide procedures have provided significant public policy
benefits in resolving disputes across a broad range of subject areas
by making it economically feasible to enforce legal rules in small-
dollar transactions, thereby providing deterrence, compensation,
and a supplement to governmental enforcement efforts. State
courts have recognized these public benefits and have acted to pro-
tect the right to aggregative procedures through the law of
unconscionability.2 4 Nevertheless, the Court has discerned a strong
federal policy favoring arbitration that provides little room for state
Arbs.), (describing the arbitration process, including extensive discovery, for a complex intel-
lectual property dispute over computer programs).
19. About Jams, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus-overview/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2013) (founded as judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services).
20. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005). Discover Bank held
that class waivers "in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between
the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged
that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money" are "in practice"
exculpatory and thus unconscionable. Id. at 1110. The Ninth Circuit relied on Discover Bank
in holding the class waiver provision in the Concepcions' contract unenforceable under Cali-
fornia law. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
21. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. The majority disregarded this fact because none of
those cases had resulted in a decision on the merits, but did not consider the proportion of
classwide litigations that result in adjudication on the merits. See id.
22. Id. at 1751.
23. Id. at 1748. The "principal advantage" of arbitration, according to the Court, is "its
informality." Id. at 1751. The Court listed three ways in which arbitration is "inconsistent with
the FAA": it sacrifices informality and makes the process slower, more costly, and more proce-
durally complex; it requires procedural formalities to protect absent class members; and its
higher stakes increase the risk to defendants without appellate review. Id. at 1751-52.
24. See, e.g., Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1105-06.
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regulation through unconscionability doctrine. And thanks to Con-
cepcion, consumers and employees today are subject to unilaterally
imposed arbitration provisions that overwhelmingly contain class
waivers. Most lower courts have interpreted Concepcion broadly.25 A
study by Public Citizen found that by the one-year anniversary of
the decision, courts had cited Concepcion to hold class arbitration
waivers enforceable in seventy-six cases.
26
This Article considers how statutory reforms might correct the
Court's policy of "over-preemption." 27 At the federal level, a legisla-
tive solution would be simple to draft but difficult to enact.
Concepcion is based on statutory interpretation, not the Constitu-
tion, and Congress could amend the FAA to make it clear that the
statute does not affect states' power to make substantive law gov-
erning contracts of adhesion. Part I discusses possible federal
responses, including three bills introduced in the last Congress that
were aimed at overturning Concepcion, as well as the potential for
federal agency regulations to limit class waivers. None of these po-
tential federal responses has so far been successful, and in the
current political climate it appears increasingly unlikely that Con-
gress will pass legislation to limit or reverse Concepcion.
By contrast, while legislation might be more likely to succeed in
some state legislatures, it would be much more difficult for states to
draft legislation that could withstand the pre-emptive power of the
FAA and Concepcion in the absence of federal legislation. The
Supremacy Clause assures that Concepcion preemption forecloses
both judicial and legislative attempts by states to regulate class waiv-
ers in arbitration agreements, and lower courts have not shown any
inclination to read the case narrowly.
In Part II I propose a possible state legislative response in the
form of a qui tam or private attorney general action to redress viola-
tions of consumer protection or labor laws. The California Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), which employs a qui tam
mechanism to enforce provisions of the state labor code, is a well-
developed example of this approach. After examining the structure
and operation of PAGA, I suggest ways this model could be adapted
to authorize private aggregate enforcement of consumer and em-
ployment laws without triggering FAA preemption or vulnerability
25. See Sternlight, supra note 4, at 708 ("Most courts are rejecting all potential distinc-
tions and are instead applying Concepcion broadly as a 'get out of class actions free' card.").
26. CHRISTINE HINES ET AL., Pun. CITIZEN, JuSTICE DENIED: ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS
TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S Concepcion Decision are Plainly Evident 4 (2012),
available at http://www.citizen.org/concepcion-anniversar-justice-denied.
27. See Gross, supra note 3.
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to contractual class waivers. The text of PAGA is provided as an
Appendix.
I. POSSIBLE FEDERAL RESPONSES
The obvious way to correct an error in the Court's interpretation
of a federal statute is for Congress to amend the law. For example,
one of the first legislative acts of the 111 th Congress was to pass the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200928 for the purpose of overturn-
ing the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.29 Several
bills have been introduced to limit or overturn Concepcion.30
A. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011
On the day Concepcion was handed down, Senator Al Franken an-
nounced that he would re-introduce legislation to prohibit "forced
arbitration clauses."' The Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA)3 2 would
amend the FAA to invalidate all pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in consumer, employment, and civil rights actions.3 3 The preamble
contains legislative findings that the FAA was originally "intended
28. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
29. 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (holding that Title VII's six month statute of limitations begins
to run the first time an employee receives unequal pay and does not recommence with each
paycheck). Similarly, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006), was passed in part to overturn the Court's holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006), that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2006), were not intended to apply to cases already pend-
ing. See alsoPlaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1997) (striking down statute passed
to overturn the Court's interpretation of the limitations period applicable to suits brought
under Rule lOb-5).
30. SeeJudith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REv. 78, 165-67 (2011) (discussing various bills
responding to Court expansion of the FAA by limiting its application to certain consumers or
employees).
31. Press Release, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Announce Legisla-
tion Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts Against Corporations (Apr. 27, 2011),
available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press.release&id=1466.
32. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 (AFA), S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). The statute,
identical to a bill introduced in the previous congressional session, would add a new Chapter
4 to the FAA. It is identical to the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong.
(2009), except that its provisions would no longer apply to franchise agreements. See Sara
Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's
Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. Rv. 457, 459 n.4 (2011).
33. AFA, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011), (amending the FAA to include Chapter 4,
§ 402(a)). The decision whether the statute applies to a particular arbitration agreement
would have to be made by a court rather than by an arbitrator. Id. § 402(b)(1).
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to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally simi-
lar sophistication and bargaining power, " 34 that decisions by the
Supreme Court "have changed the meaning of the Act" in applying
it to consumer and employment disputes,35 and that under current
law "most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful
choice whether to submit their claims to arbitration. ' 36 The bill, in
short, proposes to correct the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the FAA.
37
The bill sweeps more broadly than simply overruling Concepcion.
It would overturn the entire direction of the Supreme Court's FAA
preemption jurisprudence by making the FAA inapplicable to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in consumer and employment con-
tracts, the most common categories of contracts between parties of
unequal bargaining power.3 8 The bill would set a course correction
to the Supreme Court's project of extending its preference for arbi-
tration to consumer contracts of adhesion.39 While some critics
have argued that a prohibition on pre-dispute mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in consumer and employment contracts goes too far
and all that is needed is a ban on class waivers, 40 the better view
recognizes that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts of adhe-
sion can never be truly voluntary. The Congress that enacted the
FAA never intended it to reach employment contracts or consumer
contracts of adhesion, and it is fully within the present Congress's
34. Id. § 2(1).
35. Id. § 2(2).
36. Id. § 2(3).
37. Other provisions of the AFA would exempt collective bargaining agreements be-
tween employers and unions, or between two labor organizations, id. § 402(b) (2), but such
agreements may not "have the effect of waiving the right" to judicially enforce the federal
Constitution, state constitution, or federal or state statutory right. Id. But see Michael J.
Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REv. 729, 757 (2012) (question-
ing whether Congress has the power to forbid states from enforcing agreements to arbitrate
disputes over state-created rights).
38. Unlike the 2009 AFA bill, the statute would not apply to franchise agreements, so
the Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding arbitration
agreements in franchise agreements enforceable notwithstanding state law to the contrary)
would continue to be good law.
39. One might question whether its protections should apply to all employment con-
tracts, including those of high-level, sophisticated individuals such as top management.
40. See Cole, supra note 32, at 461, 491-93 (contending that a prohibition on all pre-
dispute arbitration provisions is "draconian" and "excessively overbroad" and arguing instead
that procedural reforms, including barring class waivers, would be sufficient); Christopher
Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration Fairness Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 13, 2011), http://
www.scotusblog.com/201l/09/concepcion-and-the-arbitration-fairness-act (arguing that the
AFA is overbroad because corporations use arbitration clauses for reasons besides avoiding
classwide proceedings and because a uniform federal law would prevent states from adopting
their own policies); Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U. PENN. L. REv. 1233,
1273 (2011).
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power to return to the original purpose of simply making voluntary
arbitration agreements enforceable. If arbitration is a superior
method of dispute resolution for consumers because it is faster,
cheaper, and simpler, they should be willing to opt in to a voluntary
program after the dispute arises and they understand the stakes.
The AFA gained substantial, but not bipartisan, support, with six-
teen co-sponsors in the Senate and eighty-one in the House, all of
them Democrats. The bill languished in committee from May 2011
onward. 41 With no Republican co-sponsors, lengthy recesses during
the presidential election season, the House under Republican con-
trol, and Congress's attention focused on avoiding the "fiscal cliff'
in January 2013, the bill died in committee. The bill was reintro-
duced in the 113th Congress in May 2013.42
B. The Fair Arbitration Act of 2011
The Fair Arbitration Act of 2011, authored by Republican Sena-
tor Jeff Sessions, would have provided a narrower, procedural
response. 43 This bill, based largely on the American Arbitration As-
sociation's Consumer Due Process Protocol, 44 "sought to ensure the
continuing viability of arbitration while enhancing its effectiveness
through certain reforms."45 The bill would have amended the FAA
to require that any arbitration clause have a heading printed in
bold capital letters, state whether arbitration is mandatory or elec-
tive, provide a contact for a consumer to inquire about costs, fees,
and forms required for participation, and state that a consumer or
employee may proceed in small claims court rather than arbitra-
tion.46 It would have required additional procedural protections
41. See Arbitration: Is it Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, l12th
Cong. (2011).
42. The bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Hank Johnson, D-GA, and in the
Senate by Sen. Al Franken. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, http://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/i 13/hr1844/text; S.878, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/
s878. See Rep. Johnson Introduces Bill to Protect Legal Rights of Consumers, available at http://
hankjohnson.house.gov/press-release/rep-johnson-re-introduces-bill-protect-legal-rights-
consumers.
43. S. 1186, 112th Cong. (1st sess., introduced June 13, 2011).
44. Other arbitration providers provide similar procedural guarantees. See generally
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 79
TENN. L. R~v. 289 (2012).
45. Andrew L. Sandler & Victoria Holstein-Childress, Supreme Court and Congress Focus on
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements: The Debate Continues, 27 WESTiAW J. CORP. OF-
FICERS & Dissc-roRs LIABILrrY, July 5, 2011, at 7-8.
46. Fair Arbitration Act of 2011, S. 1186, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011) (amending Title 9,
U.S. Code, to add a § 17, and specifically a § 17(a) governing fair disclosure).
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such as a competent and neutral arbitrator who has no personal or
financial interest in the dispute or ties to the parties, a voice for the
parties in the selection of the arbitrator, ethical and disclosure rules
for arbitrators, and administration of the arbitration by a neutral
alternative dispute resolution organization rather than by one of
the parties. 47 In addition, the parties would have had the right to be
represented by a lawyer, to have notice and an opportunity to be
heard, and to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, as well
as a limited right to discovery.48 The bill would have done nothing
to change Concepcion's holding that state rules barring class waivers
are preempted or its assertion that class procedures are fundamen-
tally inconsistent with arbitration.
The Fair Arbitration Act was referred to committee in June 2011,
where it died.
49
C. The Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011.
Senator Blumenthal, a primary supporter of the AFA, also intro-
duced a more limited ban on pre-dispute arbitration agreements
that was similar to the AFA but would have applied only to mobile
phone service contracts, thus limiting it squarely to the facts of Con-
cepcion.50 The apparent purpose of the bill was to encourage
support for the AFA from Republicans on the Judiciary Committee
who had previously supported industry-specific bans on arbitration
clauses.51 The bill was included in the Judiciary Committee hearings
47. Id. (creating 9 U.S.C. § 17(b) to afford additional procedural protections in
arbitration).
48. The bill also provides for time limits for the parties' submissions and the arbitrator's
decision and requires a written explanation of the factual and legal basis for the decision. Id.
(adding 9 U.S.C. §§ 17(9)-(10)).
49. S. 1186 (112th): Fair Arbitration Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/112/s186 (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
50. Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Cong. (2011) (co-sponsored
by Senators Franken and Whitehouse).
51. Mike Sacks, Arbitration Kickback: Supreme Court's Anti-Consumer Rulings Trigger Demo-
cratic Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (October 20, 2011, 4:09 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
201 1/10/20/arbitration-supreme-court-decisions-democratic-bills n_1022207.html ("Staffers
in Franken's office explained the senator's support for the more targeted Consumer Mobile
Fairness Act by noting the bipartisan popularity of other industry-specific restrictions on pre-
dispute arbitration agreements."). Sen. Grassley, for example, successfully sponsored a bill
that restricted arbitration clauses in the poultry industry, Fair Contracts for Growers Act of
2007, S. 221, 110th Congress (2007), and Sen. Hatch successfully sponsored a similar bill
limiting arbitration between automobile dealers and manufacturers, Motor Vehicle
Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140, 107th Cong. (2011). Sen.
Franken referred to these earlier bills in his opening statement during the Judiciary Commit-
tee hearings. Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 1-2 (2011) (opening statement of Sen. Franken).
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on the AFA, but did not receive significant attention in its own
right.
D. Prospects for Federal Legislation
Though the Arbitration Fairness Act died in committee during
2012, it garnered significant support and has been reintroduced in
the current Congress.52 The prospects for passage are not encour-
aging, however. Congress is divided along partisan lines to a nearly
unprecedented extent, and congressional Republicans have been
willing to block any legislation proposed by Democrats through
procedural maneuvers, even if they would not have the votes to re-
ject the legislation outright. Conservative Republicans tend to
oppose litigation against corporations as frivolous and view class ac-
tions in particular as extortionate. In such a climate, no proposal to
allow consumers and employees to bring a large number of claims
against corporations is likely to succeed. The passage of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act actually emphasizes this point. That legisla-
tion was passed at the very beginning of the 112th Congress, when
Democrats held a majority in both houses and a near-filibuster-
proof majority in the Senate,53 political momentum was strongly
with the Democrats, and Republicans had not yet settled on their
strategy of monolithically blocking Democratic-sponsored legisla-
tion. Moreover, the legislation was strongly supported by interest
groups such as unions. Even if the Supreme Court's statutory inter-
pretation of the FAA is objectively incorrect and is viewed as
incorrect by a majority of the present Congress, many institutional
factors make it difficult for Congress to enact corrective legisla-
tion.54 Thus, the prospects for federal legislative reform are not
promising at the moment.
52. See supra notes 41, 42 and accompanying text.
53. It is customary to say that Democrats held a sixty-seat majority, but that is not really
true. The Minnesota Senate election was subject to extensive recounts and litigation, and Al
Franken was not seated until July 7, 2009. Additionally, after his diagnosis of brain cancer in
June 2008, Senator Ted Kennedy became progressively less able to participate in daily busi-
ness until his death in August 2009, eventually appearing only to cast crucial votes on
legislation such as health care reform and the stimulus plan (in both cases he voted for
cloture but did not participate in the final vote). This left the Democrats short of the sixty
votes needed to stop a filibuster.
54. For an excellent economic analysis of the transaction costs of enacting corrective
legislation, see Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM. &
MARv L. Rav. 1251 (2013).
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E. Federal Agency Regulations Limiting Class Arbitration Waivers
In the absence of congressional action, reform might be possible
through federal agency action. Regulations limiting class waivers or
otherwise constraining the terms of arbitration clauses in adhesive
contracts might even be entitled to Chevron deference. 55 Such regu-
lations, of course, could only govern contracts within the agency's
sphere of authority and could not apply broadly to all consumer
contracts.
Professor Wasserman notes that on occasion federal agencies
have issued regulations invalidating class action waivers, notably a
National Labor Relations Board decision relating to employment
contracts56 and a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
regulation barring class waivers in securities brokerage agree-
ments.5 7 The Fifth Circuit declined to follow the NLRB's lead, as
have most district courts .5  One federal district court has denied a
motion to compel arbitration based on the FINRA regulation 5 9 and
another dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a declaratory judgment
action against the agency challenging the regulation.60 A FINRA
panel later ruled that the FAA prohibited it from enforcing the reg-
ulation against Charles Schwab after Schwab amended its
mandatory arbitration provision to include a class waiver.
61
In response to the FINRA panel decision, a group of thirty-seven
Democratic members of Congress, led by Senator Franken, wrote to
the SEC urging it to exercise its authority under section 921 of the
Dodd-Frank Act to restrict or bar mandatory arbitration provisions
55. See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 422-28.
56. In re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012) (requir-
ing contractual class action waiver as condition of employment violates employees'
substantive federal statutory right to engage in concerted action).
57. See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 422-28.
58. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
An appeal of the NLRB's decision is currently pending in the Fifth Circuit. D. R. Horton,
Inc., v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. filed Jan. 13, 2012); Owen, 702 F.3d at 1054 n.2.
59. Alakozai v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30759 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
60. Following Concepcion, Charles Schwab inserted a class action waiver in its customer
agreements and sued for a declaratory judgment that FINRA could not enforce its regula-
tion. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because of Schwab's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Court Dismisses Schwab's Challenge to FINRA Rule
forFailure toExhaust Administrative Remedies, SECuaRriEs LAw PROF BLOC (May 14, 2012), http:/
/lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2012/05/court-dismisses-schwabs-challenge-to-finra-
rule-for-failure-to-exhaust-administrative-remedies.html.
61. FINRA Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co. (CRD No. 5393), No.
2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 (Feb. 21, 2013).
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in contracts between securities brokers and their customers. 62 The
North American Securities Administrators Association also urged
the SEC to adopt regulations banning class waivers (and, indeed, all
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements).63 The SEC would
have authority under Dodd-Frank to bar class waivers in broker-cus-
tomer and investment advisor contracts, but it has not yet acted to
do so.64
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) could regu-
late class waivers in consumer financial contracts. Section 1028 of
the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the CFPB to study the use of pre-
dispute arbitration in consumer contracts for financial products or
services and to submit a report to Congress.65 The Act also confers
on the CFPB seemingly broad authority to promulgate regulations
to "prohibit or impose conditions or limitations" on pre-dispute ar-
bitration clauses in contracts for consumer financial products or
services "if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition
of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection
of consumers."66 The CFPB announced in April 2012 that it would
62. Press Release, Al Franken, Sen. Franken Leads Charge to Protect Consumers' Legal
Rights Against Wall Street (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press.re-
lease&id=2381; see SEC Urged to Curb Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Customer Contracts, Class
Action Litig. Report (BNA) (May 1, 2013), http://news.bna.com/clsn/CLSNWB/splitdis-
play.adp?fedfid=30887815&vname=clasnotallissues&jd=a0d8b8j4r5&split=0.
63. Letter from A. Heath Absure, President, North American Securities Administrators
Association, to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 3,
2013), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NASAA-Letter-to-SEC-on-Arbi-
tration-and-Class-Action-Waivers.pdf.
64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 921, 124 Stat. 1376 § 1841 (2010), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 80b-5(f) (2010). Section
921 gives the SEC authority:
[B]y rule, [to] prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements
that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer
to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws,
the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public
interest and for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78o. It also gives similar authority with respect to contracts with investment advi-
sors. 15 U.S.C. 80b-5(f).
65. Id. at § 1028(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518).
66. Id. at § 1028(b) (emphasis added). Specifically, § 1028(b) authorizes the CFPB to:
[P]rohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a
covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing
for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such
a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and
for the protection of consumers.
All promulgated regulations must be consistent with the results of the study conducted by the
agency under § 1028(a). Id.
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open a public inquiry into the effects of arbitration clauses on
consumers.
67
Though the CFPB may have statutory authority to limit Concep-
cion in the consumer credit and banking context through
regulation,68 this power is itself constrained. To begin with, the
CFPB's authority is expressly confined to contracts for consumer
financial products and services. Moreover, regulations must await
and be consistent with the results of the pending study and an ac-
companying report to Congress. It would take time to conduct a
study that could support a nationwide regulation with teeth,69 and
promulgation and implementation could be further delayed by liti-
gation under the APA or by congressional action after receipt of the
report.
More practically, there is no private right of action to enforce
violations of CFPB rules. If the agency were to promulgate rules
relating to pre-dispute arbitration agreements, those rules could
only be enforced by agency action seeking monetary penalties or
injunctive or equitable relief.70
It is also quite possible that the Supreme Court would strike
down any CFPB regulation that it perceived as attempting to re-
verse Concepcion or its other FAA decisions. Over the past three
decades, the Court has consistently expressed a strong policy pref-
erence for arbitration (all the while attributing this preference to
Congress). The Court has also been skeptical of agency regulations
that authorize litigation rights that the Court itself is not prepared
to find in statutes. 71 It might be difficult for a CFPB study to provide
67. Press Release, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal Applauds CFPB for Inquiry
Into Arbitration Clauses (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/reease/bumenthal-appauds-cfpb-for-inquiry-into-arbitration-causes.
68. See Sternlight, supra note 4, at 726-27.
69. See Laetita L. Cheltenham, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Class Action
Waivers AfterAT&T v. Concepcion, 16 N.C. BANVING INsT. 273, 294 (2012). Compounding the
delay necessitated by the requirement of a study, such a regulation, once promulgated, would
apply only to agreements entered into at least 180 days after the regulation becomes final.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(d).
70. See Sandier & Holstein-Childress, supra note 45, at 6.
71. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that an implied right
of action to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not extend to regulations
prohibiting conduct having disparate impact). To be sure, that case implicated constitutional
issues regarding the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and arose during a period in
which the Court was engaged in the project of changing the rules for implying rights of
action. Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating a federal statute that
attempted to re-impose a First Amendment standard that the Court had recently changed).
But the Court has also scrutinized statutes attempting to reverse the Court's interpretation of
statutes. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding that a statute that
attempted to reinstate cases that had been dismissed based on a previous decision interpret-
ing statutory limitations period violated separation of powers).
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findings that the Court would view as sufficient to justify a ban on
pre-dispute arbitration agreements or class waivers.
72
Moreover, the CFPB's very ability to function is currently in ques-
tion. Senate Republicans prevented the agency from coming into
existence for months after the legislation creating the agency went
into effect by refusing to confirm a director. 73 President Obama
had to make a controversial recess appointment to allow the agency
to begin operations.7 4 The D.C. Circuit has drawn the legality of
such recess appointments-routinely employed by previous presi-
dents-into question.75 If the decision stands, the CFPB could be
further hamstrung.
In the end, the weakness of the fledgling CFPB, Republican op-
position to both the agency and the proposed AFA, and the
statutory requirement that the CFPB complete a study before
promulgating regulations make it unlikely that the CFPB will at-
tempt to regulate arbitration clauses soon. And if it did, as Professor
Wasserman points out, it would not be surprising if the Supreme
Court invalidated the regulations because they "trench" on "the
pro-arbitration policy that the Court has read into the FAA." 76
II. A PROPOSAL FOR A STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The availability of classwide proceedings provides important pub-
lic policy benefits, especially where unlawful conduct affects many
72. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mark J. Levin, & Martin C. Bryce, Jr., Arbitration Developments:
Concepcion- The Supreme Court Decisively Steps In, 67 Bus. LAw. 629, 638 (2012). The Court
has held even congressional findings to an impossibly rigorous standard when it frowns on
the substantive enactment. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) (voluminous congressional record for Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
held insufficient to meet the congruence and proportionality test); Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Act v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) ("Congress came up with
little evidence of infringement on the part of the States" to support abrogation of state sover-
eign immunity in the Patent Remedy Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(noting that Congress did not have evidence of constitutional violations in all or most states
when it enacted the Violence Against Women Act).
73. Kaplinsky et al., supra note 72, at 638.
74. The appointment has been described as "a bold act of political defiance." David
Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Appoints Richard Cordray to Head Consumer Watchdog Bu-
reau, WASH. POST, (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-04/
politics/35441368 1 richard-cordray-president-obama-consumer-financial-protection-
bureau.
75. See Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (invalidating three NLRB
recess appointments made by President Obama during an "intrasession" recess throughout
which the Senate gaveled in and out of pro forma sessions and thus, the court determined,
was formally in session). Canning places the NLRB decision banning class waivers in employ-
ment contracts, see supra note 56, as well as the CFPB's ability to function at all, in doubt.
76. Wasserman, supra note 7, at 431.
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people for small amounts-for example, in consumer transactions
and standardized employment contracts. Aggregation creates in-
centives for private enforcement to augment enforcement by
prosecutors and government agencies, which increases deterrence
and compliance with the law, reduces the opportunities for exter-
nalizing the costs of risky or fraudulent behavior, and provides a
measure of compensation to people harmed by unlawful conduct.
In a time when state governments are strapped for resources and
are forced to slash budgets, private enforcement can be especially
important.
After Concepcion and the Supreme Court's other recent FAA-pre-
emption cases, however, it will be far more difficult for states to act
to preserve access to aggregative procedures than it would be for
Congress. 7 A host of state and lower federal court decisions have
held that state laws attempting to prohibit class waivers in arbitra-
tion are preempted by Concepcion.78 State legislatures could not
avoid preemption by enacting statutes prohibiting class waivers,
even if they applied to litigation and arbitration equally, because
FAA preemption applies to all state laws, whatever their source. 79
Concepcion's pro-arbitration policy is so strong that it virtually
forecloses state regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses in con-
sumer or employment contracts. This is true even when-like the
Discover Bank rule-the state law is part of the state's substantive law
of contracts and addresses contracts of adhesion however they may
be enforced, whether through litigation or in arbitration.80 At its
77. Additionally, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, which clamped down on certification of employ-
ment discrimination cases for damages under Rule 23(b)(2) and raised the bar for finding
commonality in all types of class actions, will also greatly limit the possibilities for class treat-
ment of small claims. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
78. See, e.g., Coneffv. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding Wash-
ington state contract law barring class waivers is preempted by FAA); Cruz v. Cingular
Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1212-13 (lth Cir. 2011) ("to the extent that Florida law
would ... invalidate the class waiver ... [it] is preempted."); Litman v. Cellco P'ship, 655
F.3d 225, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding NewJersey law to be preempted); Sternlight, supra
note 4, at 707-17 (collecting and analyzing state and federal decisions) ("Readers can almost
feel the anguish of certain judges who state in their opinions that they would have liked to
void the class action waiver but felt their hands were tied by Concepcion."); HINES, supra note
26, at 4 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., In re Apple & AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., No. C-10-02553 RMW,
2011 WL 2886407, at *3 (N.D. Cal Jul. 19, 2011) (holding that a claim that a California
statute bars class waivers is preempted under Concepcion); Sternlight, supra note 4, at 727
("State legislatures have quite limited power to combat the effects of Concepcion given prior
Supreme Court decisions. In particular, state legislatures can neither prohibit mandatory
arbitration nor prohibit use of arbitral class action waivers."); Colin P. Marks, The Irony of
AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SuPPLEMENT 31, 32 (2012) ("[Any attempt by a court or
state legislature to limit the method and means of arbitration in a way inconsistent with what
Congress envisioned is preempted by the FAA.").
80. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005).
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heart, the Discover Bank rule concerned fundamental issues of con-
tract formation, the nature of consent, and the practical efficacy of
contractual remedies, issues that are within the core of substantive
contract law. Having held that even such a substantive, nondiscrimi-
natory rule of state contract law is pre-empted by the FAA, it seems
almost foreordained that the Court would strike down any state reg-
ulation limiting what businesses could include in mandatory
arbitration clauses with individuals.
The ability to bring small claims in aggregate proceedings is re-
garded by many states as an important public policy, however. In
Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court emphasized the "im-
portant role of class action remedies in California law""' and the
strong and long-standing California policy favoring class actions,82
as well as the state's history of finding procedural unconscionability
in contracts of adhesion containing unfair terms. s5 As the California
Supreme Court said forty years ago (and repeated in Discover Bank):
A class action by consumers produces several salutary by-prod-
ucts, including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who
indulge in fraudulent practices, aid to legitimate business en-
terprises by curtailing illegitimate competition, and avoidance
to the judicial process of the burden of multiple litigation in-
volving identical claims. The benefit to the parties and the
courts would, in many circumstances, be substantial.
8 4
Individual enforcement may be impractical in arbitration as well
as in traditional litigation when claims are small, and private en-
forcement may be even more necessary for state law claims than for
federal claims. The Supreme Court's stated assumption that indi-
vidual claims are "most unlikely to go unresolved" under an
arbitration clause such as the one in Concepcion is implausible. 5
81. Id. at 1106.
82. See id. at 1105-06.
83. See id. at 1106 ("[C]ontroversies involving widely used contracts of adhesion present
ideal cases for class adjudication." (quoting Keating v. Super. Ct., 645 P.2d 1192, 1207 (Cal.
1982))).
84. Id. at 1105 (quoting Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69 (1971)); see also
id. at 1106 ("This court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the class action device
for vindicating rights asserted by large groups of persons." (quoting Keating, 645 P.2d at 1199
(authorizing classwide arbitration in appropriate cases))).
85. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. Individual consumers may not realize their rights have
been violated, or may find it too confusing or not economically worthwhile to pursue a claim.
Even if they realize they have a claim, they are unlikely to try to hire a lawyer for a small
recovery, being unaware of the attorneys' fee provision, and a lawyer is unlikely to take the
case because the promise of attorneys' fees and a large award will never be realized. In his
dissent, Justice Stevens observed that the "$7,500 payout . . . that supposedly [made] the
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Many consumer and employment claims under state law are com-
mon law claims rather than statutory claims and thus are not
enforced by state agencies. Even for state statutory claims that do
have a responsible agency, budget constraints are likely to be more
severe for state government than for the federal government, par-
ticularly during the long recession. Concepcion is thus likely to create
an enforcement gap, particularly in consumer and employment
cases where claims are small and one side is in a position to impose
a standard contract of adhesion containing an arbitration clause
with a class waiver.
86
States therefore may have good reason to want to find a way to
secure the benefits of private enforcement for mass small claims.
87
Before Concepcion, California, Washington, and New Jersey had
found class waivers in contracts of adhesion unconscionable-in
California, where damages were predictably small and the party
with superior bargaining power "carried out a scheme to deliber-
ately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small
sums of money";8 8 in Washington, where damages were small and
"class action litigation or arbitration is the only practical remedy
available";89 and in New Jersey, when waivers "functionally excul-
pate wrongful conduct."90
Concepcions' arbitration worthwhile" was illusory because all AT&T had to do to avoid this
payout was to tender the amount of the claim to anyone who got as far as filing a claim. Id. at
1760-61. Instead, Justice Stevens noted, "The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17
million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."
Id. at 1761 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F. 3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Posner, J.)), Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman estimate that bilateral arbitration of the Con-
cepcions' claim would cost more than $25,000 in attorneys' fees and observe that "it is almost
impossible to imagine a court awarding $25,000 (or anything remotely close) as a 'reasonable
fee' for recovering $30.22." After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 623, 646-47 (2012).
86. At least one court has held that Concepcion only bars categorical state rules that invali-
date all class waivers but permits "fact-sensitive analysis" of whether a class waiver is
unconscionable in a particular context. Coiro v. Wachovia Bank, No. 11-3587, 2012 WL
628514 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012). See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 77. Even if Concepcion does
leave this door ajar (which seems unlikely, as the Court was unfazed by the possibility that
some claims would go unredressed), few actions would likely be permitted to go forward.
This is particularly true since the contract at issue in Concepcion provides a Supreme Court-
approved template for drafting class waivers.
87. Some commentators have proposed that state attorneys general could bridge the
"enforcement gap" by bringing parens patriae suits under existing law, perhaps retaining pri-
vate attorneys under contingent-fee arrangements to augment their existing staffs. See Gilles
& Friedman, supra note 85, at 658. The mechanisms for such actions are well understood and
I do not discuss them here.
88. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
89. Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1009 (Wash. 2007).
90. Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 189 N.J. 1, 21-22 (N.J. 2006).
But see Sternlight, supra note 4, at n.14.
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One way to accomplish this goal, even after Concepcion, would be
to approach the problem from a different direction. Rather than
trying to prevent corporations from requiring consumers and em-
ployees to resolve their claims for contractual monetary remedies in
bilateral arbitration, a state could create an alternative means for
private enforcement of the substantive law. That is, rather than
looking for a way for consumers and employees to bring their indi-
vidual claims for compensatory damages in an aggregate
proceeding in order to preserve the public benefits of holding vio-
lators liable, the state could simply provide a means for private
litigants to enforce the substantive law directly, without the need to
amass individual damages claims. Specifically, a state could enact a
statutory penalty for consumer fraud or violation of state labor laws
and provide for private enforcement through a qui tam or private
attorney general action.
This section first discusses how qui tam actions could provide a
way out of the Concepcion dilemma and then describes one such stat-
ute, California's Private Attorneys General Act. As I explain in more
detail below, such a statute, if carefully drafted, could provide an
alternative mechanism to deter misconduct when classwide pro-
ceedings are preempted.
A. Thinking Outside the Box: Qui Tam Actions
How might a state attempt to preserve the public policy benefits
of aggregate enforcement after Concepcion? Trying to directly regu-
late or override class waivers appears futile because of the breadth
of the Court's preemption doctrine. Post-Concepcion legislative ef-
forts to prohibit class action waivers in Maryland and California
have been unsuccessful, perhaps partly because of this considera-
tion. Recently, California narrowly rejected a bill that would have
added a provision to the California Civil Code banning all class ac-
tion waivers, whether for litigation or for arbitration, in contracts of
adhesion.91 The bill's proponents argued that "the bill is needed to
91. S. 491, 2012 Leg., 2011-2012 Sess. 1 (Cal. 2012). The bill would have added § 1589.5
to the Civil Code, providing that:
Any term in a contract of adhesion purporting to waive the right to join or consolidate
claims, or to bring a claim as a representative member of a class or in a private attor-
ney general capacity shall be deemed to lack the necessary consent to waive that right,
and is void.
Id. See Cheryl Miller, Legislation to Blunt "Concepcion" Is Killed in State Assembly, THE RECORDER
(July 3, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202561826154&
slretum=l,
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respond to a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court last year uphold-
ing a contract provision that required the waiver of class arbitration
rights and striking down a California court rule to the contrary." 92
The principal opposition to the proposed legislation raised con-
cerns that it was preempted by the FAA.93 The bill died in
committee, at least partly because of doubts about whether preemp-
tion would apply.
94
A similar bill that would have made pre-dispute class action waiv-
ers categorically unenforceable passed overwhelmingly in the
Maryland House of Delegates in 2011, but was narrowly defeated in
the State Senate. 95 Some opponents argued that in becoming the
first state to adopt an outright ban on class waivers, "Maryland
92. Hearing on S.B. 491 Before the Assemb. Com. onJudiciay, 2012 Leg., 2011-2012 Sess. 1
(Cal. 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ll-12/bill/sen/sb-0451-0500/sb_
491_cfa_20120702_112553_asm_comm.html. Supporters invoked a footnote in the majority
opinion in Concepcion to argue that the Supreme Court acknowledged the role states con-
tinue to play in contract law: "Of course States remain free to take steps addressing the
concerns that attend contracts of adhesion-for example, requiring class-action-waiver provi-
sions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted." Id. at 3 (quoting AT&TMobility
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 n.6).
93. Proponents argued that the bill did not discriminate against arbitration agreements
since it applied to waivers in both litigation and arbitration. See Brian Kabateck, SB 491:
Protecting Consumers' Right to Join Together, DuALYJ. (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.
kbklawyers.com/pdf/SB%20491-%2OProtecting%2OConsumers'%2Right%20to%20Join
%20Together.pdf (arguing that the bill is "a generally applicable rule that falls squarely
within the savings clause of the FAA."). The California Chamber of Commerce opposed the
bill, pointing out that "While the language of SB 491 appeared to only create a general
contract rule, the reality is that class action waiver clauses are primarily found in arbitration
agreements," and, therefore, "it is almost certain that SB 491 would have been struck down as
unlawful." CalChamber-Opposed Job Killer Fails to Pass Policy Committee, CALCHAMBER (July 6,
2012), http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/07062012-calchamberopposedjob
killerfailstopasspolicycommittee.aspx.
94. Miller, supra note 91 (quoting Katherine Pettibone of the Civil Justice Association of
California, a tort-reform group, as speculating that two Democrats may have refrained from
voting to report the bill out of committee in the "belielf] this would be a litigation trap and a
mess that would be pre-empted by the United States Supreme Court-again.").
95. H.D. 729, 2011 Leg., 428th Sess. (Md. 2011). The bill, entitled "Civil Actions-Class
Action Waiver in a Written Agreement-Unenforceability," stated that any "written agree-
ment made before a dispute arises between the parties to the agreement may not waive or
have the practical effect of waiving the rights of a party to that agreement to resolve the
dispute by obtaining relief as a representative or as a member of a class" and further stated
that any such agreement "may not be enforced." Id. The bill passed the House of Delegates
by a vote of 108-32 on March 17, 2011, with ten Republicans and all of the chamber's Demo-
crats in favor. Seq No. 0281, MD. GEN. ASSEMB., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/
frmMain.aspx?ys=201 lrs/votes/house/0281.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). Although the bill
was reported out of committee in the state Senate on an 8-3 party-line vote, Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee-Voting Record HB 729, MD. GEN. ASSEMB., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
2011rs/votescomm/hb0729_jpr.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2013), fourteen of the thirty-five
Senate Democrats broke with their party to oppose the bill on the final vote, and it was
defeated 25-21. Seq No. 1182, MD. GEN. ASEMB., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frm-
Main.aspx.ys=201 Irs/votes/senate/I 182.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
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would draw national attention for actions that damage its business
climate."96 The statutory language, more sweeping than the Discover
Bank rule, would almost certainly have failed the Concepcion test.
97
Nevertheless, it may be possible to obtain the benefits of private
enforcement of remedies for group harms in some contexts without
using the class action device. A historical alternative can be found
in the qui tam action. Qui tam proceedings, which trace their origins
to Roman times, allow private individuals to prosecute an action on
behalf of the state, rewarding them with property seized from the
defendant.98 Currently, such actions on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment are brought under the False Claims Act (FCA).99
The traditional qui tam action is brought by a private party to
recover money or property on the government's behalf, with the
relator receiving a portion of the recovery as an incentive to bring
the suit. The action is brought to enforce a right that belongs to the
state itself. Its primary purpose is to augment the government's abil-
ity to recover on its own claims by recruiting private enforcement.
FCA claims are usually brought by whistleblowers, who may have
better access than the government to information about fraud.100
Litigation under the FCA has recovered some $20 billion in settle-
ments or judgments since 1986 for fraudulent charges to the
federal government, roughly twice the amount the government has
96. Will Bums, Arbitration Jeopardized by Bill, MD. CHAMBER ACTION NETWORK (Mar. 30,
2011) http://www.chamberactionnetwork.com/2011/03/arbitration-jeopardized-by-bill/; see
also Consumer Financial Services Group, Maryland Legislature's Attempt to Ban Class Action
Waivers Fails, BALLAD SPAHR LLP (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspubli-
cations/legalalerts/2011-04-15_maryland-legislature-banclass_action_waivers_fails.aspx;
Roll Call 2011, Mn. Bus. FOR RESPONsIVE GoV'T (June, 2011), available at http://www.mbrg.
org/assets/documents/Roll%20Call/201 1-Roll-Call.pdf.
97. The bill was acted on before Concepcion came down, but the General Assembly's
Fiscal and Policy Note did discuss the pending case, taking no position on how the case's
outcome should affect the legislation. See DEP'T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE:
HB 729, 428th Sess., at 2-3 (Md. 2011), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2011rs/
fnotes/bil 0009/hb0729.pdf.
98. For an excellent discussion of the modern qui tam action, see David Freeman Eng-
strom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L.
RFv. 1244 (2012); see also R. Harrison Smith, A Key Time for Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and
Alabama, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2007).
99. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). See LindaJ. Stengle, Rewarding Integrity: The Struggle
to Protect Decentralized Fraud Enforcement Through the Public Disclosure Bar of the False Claims Act,
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 471, 474-75 (2008).
100. See CLAIR M. SmvI, THE FALSE CLAiMs ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 1.12
(2004); Engstrom, supra note 98. The Supreme Court has emphasized the requirement that
the relator have "insider" information. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457,
471, 475-76 (2007); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885,
1893 (2011) (finding relator may not rely on information obtained through FOIA request).
These cases suggest that the Court views whistleblowers as the paradigm FCA relators.
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recovered in suits brought without the assistance of a relator. 10 1
Many states have passed statutes based on the FCA.
102
The potential reach of qui tam actions is much broader than re-
covery of false claims, however. The government brings many
claims for money other than those for overpayments or breach of
contractual obligations. These include actions for criminal and civil
fines and penalties and actions by agencies such as the SEC for dis-
gorgement of profits from illegal activities. Persons who violate
federal securities laws, for example, are subject not only to suit by
defrauded investors, but also to civil actions by the SEC for dis-
gorgement. The primary purpose of these actions is to enforce the
law for the benefit of the investing public; a secondary purpose is to
deprive the defendant of the fruits of the illegal conduct. The SEC
often coordinates with shareholder class action litigation to dis-
tribute disgorgement proceeds to defrauded investors but is not
required to do so.
Nothing would prevent states from creating qui tam actions to
enforce any statute containing civil penalties payable to the state.
States interested in more vigorous enforcement of consumer pro-
tection laws, for example, could enact civil penalties for consumer
fraud, payable to the state, and give private individuals who have
been the subject of a violation the right to bring suit to enforce
such penalties for all similar violations by the defendant, as well as a
share of any recovery. Such actions would be for the public benefit
because they augment enforcement by government agencies,
thereby deterring wrongdoing by making the penalties for illegal
conduct more efficacious.
Most importantly from the perspective of Concepcion, an arbitra-
tion provision should not be able to bar individuals from bringing
such qui tam actions. The relator does not sue to recover group
members' individual claims for compensatory damages. Rather, a
qui tam suit seeks to recover on the state's own claim, measured by
the number of violations, and payable to the state. 10 3 Because the
101. Stengle, supra note 99, at 481 (citing the $20 billion figure); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40785, Qui TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS Act AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 1
(2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf. All told, $24.2 billion has
been recovered since 1986 in settlements and judgments from qui tam actions, while only
$10.9 billion has been recovered by the government from non-qui tam fraud actions. See
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS OVERVIEW (2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/civil/docs-forms/C-FRAUDS-FCA-Statisticspdf' Relators were paid $558 million in
2011 in 638 qui tam actions brought that year. See id; Engstrom, supra note 98, at 1270-71.
102. Smith, supra note 98, at 1207.
103. The relator has a concrete interest in the suit based on her financial stake in the
recovery, sufficient (along with the statutory conferral of a right of action) to provide
standing.
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suit does not attempt to adjudicate the legal interests of absent par-
ties, the due process concerns familiar in class action litigation are
not implicated. Even assuming that an arbitration provision could
require a relator to pursue the action in arbitration rather than in
court, it could not bar the relator from seeking a recovery based on
a large number of violations because the suit would not seek to ad-
judicate individual claims, but rather to enforce the state's right to
penalties for unlawful conduct against a group. These concepts can
be understood more clearly by considering the California Private
Attorneys General Act.
B. The California Private Attorneys General Act
California has created just such a regime in the labor context
through the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). 10 4 According to
the legislative findings, the state faced a budget shortfall in 2004
that led to understaffing in the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency (LWDA), the state agency that enforces California's labor
law, and insufficient resources for effective enforcement of the la-
bor code.10 5 To address these problems the legislature passed
PAGA, which allows an aggrieved employee to act as a "private at-
torney general" by suing the employer for civil penalties arising
from labor code violations "on behalf of himself or herself and
other current or former employees."' 0 6 Any civil penalty that can be
assessed and collected by the LWDA can also be recovered in a civil
action brought by an aggrieved employee. 10 7 If the labor code does
not specify a penalty for a violation, PAGA allows private plaintiffs
to recover a statutory penalty of $100 or $200 per violation'0 8 in
104. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 (West 2011). The text of PAGA is reproduced in the
Appendix.
105. See infra note 131 and accompanying text; 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. c. 906 § 1 (West);
Ben Nicholson, Businesses Beware: Chapter 906 Deputizes 17 Million Private Attorneys General to
Enforce the Labor Code, 35 McGEORGE L. REv. 581, 584 (2004) (describing events leading to
passage of PAGA).
106. Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1300 (2009) ("The Legisla-
ture has made clear that an action under the PAGA is in the nature of an enforcement
action, with the aggrieved employee acting as a private attorney general to collect penalties
from employers who violate labor laws."); LAB. § 2699(a).
107. LAB. § 2699(a). The plaintiff must give notice to the LWDA and can only sue if the
agency does not issue a citation. Id. § 2699.3.
108. Id. § 2699(f)(2). A court has discretion to decrease the civil penalties awarded if a
full award would be "unjust, arbitrary, and oppressive, or confiscatory." Id. § 2699(e) (2). Mi-
nor, technical violations of the labor code cannot be prosecuted in a PAGA action. See id.
§ 2699(g) (2); see also Erich Shiners, Chapter 221: A Necessary but Incomplete Revision of the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 877 (2005) (discussing a 2005 revision
of PAGA that barred private plaintiffs from asserting claims for minor code violations).
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addition to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 109 The recovery is
allocated 75 percent to the LWDA and 25 percent to the aggrieved
employees. °10 Though they are called private attorney general ac-
tions, PAGA actions thus are similar to qui tam actions as described
in the preceding section. The distinction between the two terms
comes down largely to how the recovery is allocated. In qui tam ac-
tions, the recovery goes to the government and the private plaintiff
receives a share as a bounty or reward for bringing the action. In a
private attorney general action, the plaintiff brings the action on
behalf of a group and all or a portion of the recovery goes to the
group.
111
As in a class action, PAGA allows a private individual to sue for
violations affecting a group of similarly situated persons and to re-
cover an amount based on the aggregate harm to the group. But
there are important differences from class proceedings that make
Concepcion inapplicable to PAGA actions.
To begin with, a PAGA action is a representative action, not a class
action. 112 California courts have held that PAGA suits can be
brought as class actions, but they need not be. 113 Indeed, PAGA
claims are often brought as a separate count in the same suit as
class claims. 1 4 A private plaintiff can pursue an individual claim for
compensatory damages in addition to a PAGA claim, and a judg-
ment in a PAGA action does not preclude absent employees from
bringing their own claims for compensatory damages.
Second, the PAGA action is not an aggregation of individual
claims. It is an action for a statutory penalty due to the state, the
109. LAB. § 2699(g) (1). Because PAGA provides for fee-shifting of attorney's fees, plain-
tiffs do not need to pay attorney's fees out of their share of the recovery.
110. LAB. § 2699(i).
111. See discussion infra note 115.
112. Representative actions are well known in California law. For example, in a "common
interest development" the homeowners' association can bring a representative action in its
own name, as the real party in interest, for damage to the common areas (and certain other
actions) withoutjoining the individual owners. Any recovery goes to the association. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1368.3, formerly CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 383.
113. E.g., Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 981-88 (2009); Lopez v. Ace Cash
Express, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2012). A federal court case hold-
ing that California would interpret PAGA to require that the action be brought as a class
action, Benitez v. Wilbur, CV F 08-1122 LJO GSA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15018, at *29 (E.D.
Cal. 2009), apparently decided before the California Supreme Court's decision in Arias, is
erroneous. See also Willner v. Manpower, Inc., No. C 11-02846 JSW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62227, at *21-26 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (PAGA claims are fundamentally different from class
actions).
114. See, e.g., Arias, 46 Cal. 4th 969 (plaintiff alleged six counts for individual claims, four
counts on behalf of himself and other employees, and one PAGA count; the California Su-
preme Court held that the claims brought on behalf of other employees had to meet class
action requirements but the PAGA claims did not).
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amount of which is measured by the number of violations. Insofar
as part of the recovery goes "to the aggrieved employees," it is
"awarded not to the individual plaintiff but to the aggrieved em-
ployees as a whole."' 15 The penalties are "common and undivided
with those employees on whose representative behalf [the plaintiff]
sues." 16 A private plaintiff cannot bring a PAGA suit based solely on
violations with respect to herself, but must sue to recover penalties
for violations against the whole group. 117 Indeed, "the PAGA plain-
tiff has no individual right to recovery"" 8 and "does not sue under
PAGA to vindicate his individual interest."119 Neither the plaintiff
nor the other employees even have an individual claim under
PAGA, any more than a relator in a False Claims Act case has a
personal right to the sums the defendant fraudulently obtained
from the government. A judgment in a PAGA case precludes gov-
ernment agencies and other employees from suing on the same
(PAGA) claim, but is not binding as to non-party employees' indi-
vidual claims.
20
Because PAGA actions do not adjudicate anyone's individual
claims, they do not present the issues of notice, due process, and
commonality that the Supreme Court considered beyond the ken
of arbitrators.1 2' The California Supreme Court has explicitly held
that class action requirements do not apply to PAGA actions be-
cause the individual interests of non-party employees are not being
115. Id. at *10; see also Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No. 2:ll-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114746, at *22 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("The statute therefore contemplates a
common group action with civil penalties being awarded to the entire group."). Courts have
analogized PAGA actions to shareholder derivative suits, "in that the aggrieved employees as
a whole sustain the injury, and the PAGA plaintiff steps into the shoes of those employees
and the LWDA to seek a remedy as a result of the alleged violations." Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70051, at *11-12; see also Thomas v. Aetna Health of Cal., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01906-AWI-
SKO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59377, at *17 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
116. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *10.
117. Id. at *13 ("[T]he parties do bring their claim only with one another."); accord,
Machado v. M.A.T. & Sons Landscape, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00459 JAM JFM, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63414, at *7 ("PAGA's language explicitly states that the representative action must
include 'other current or former employees.'").
118. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *12; accord Thomas 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59377, at *58 ("Aggrieved employees have no right to seek any individual recovery under
PAGA .... [They] have no separate and individual rights to pursue under PAGA that would
transform it from a law enforcement action that furthers the interests of the LWDA into a
myriad of separate and distinct claims of the aggrieved employees.").
119. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *10.
120. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969,985 (2009). Ajudgment in a PAGA action is
not, of course, binding as to aggrieved employees' individual claims for compensatory dam-
ages, because individual claims are not at issue. See infra notes 132-39.
121. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 503 (2011); Alcantar v.
Hobart Serv. No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG (Spx), 2013 WL 146323, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
(collecting cases).
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adjudicated. 122 The entire portion of Concepcion's analysis that dis-
cusses the need to comply with due process requirements
governing class actions and the unfamiliarity of arbitrators with
those requirements is thus wholly irrelevant to PAGA actions.
More fundamentally, the reason why PAGA claims are not within
the ambit of FAA preemption under Concepcion is that they do not
involve claims belonging to private individuals at all. The claim is
not for private compensation, but for a civil penalty, the claim be-
longs to the state, and the penalty is payable to the state and
collectable by a state agency. The private plaintiff stands in the
state's shoes to litigate the action for the public benefit, not to vin-
dicate a private right. These characteristics remove PAGA claims
from the reach of Concepcion because private individuals cannot
contract away the state's right to enforce the law.
PAGA was enacted to augment the enforcement power of the
LWDA in a time when severe budget constraints had caused the
agency to be underfunded and understaffed. 123 The legislature
aimed to harness the power of the private bar to assure "maximum
compliance" with the labor code, based on a legislative finding that
in many cases "the only meaningful deterrent to unlawful conduct"
is "the vigorous assessment and collection of civil penalties," and
that private enforcement would provide an "effective disincentive
for employers to engage in unlawful and anticompetitive labor
practices." 124 California and federal courts have correctly viewed
PAGA in this light.
122. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 984-86; see also Brown, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 499.
123. See Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 980 ("The Legislature declared that adequate financing of
labor law enforcement was necessary to achieve maximum compliance with state labor laws,
that staffing levels for labor law enforcement agencies had declined and were unlikely to
keep pace with the future growth of the labor market, and that it was therefore in the public
interest to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil
penalties for Labor Code violations.. ").
124. The legislative findings accompanying the statute state:
(a) Adequate financing of essential labor law enforcement functions is necessary to
achieve maximum compliance with state labor laws in the underground economy and
to ensure an effective disincentive for employers to engage in unlawful and anticom-
petitive business practices.
(b) Although innovative labor law education programs and self-policing efforts by
industry watchdog groups may have some success in educating some employers about
their obligations under state labor laws, in other cases the only meaningful deterrent
to unlawful conduct is the vigorous assessment and collection of civil penalties as pro-
vided in the Labor Code.
(c) Staffing levels for state labor law enforcement agencies have, in general, de-
clined over the last decade and are likely to fail to keep up with the growth of the
labor market in the future.
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According to the courts, a PAGA action "is essentially a law en-
forcement action designed to benefit the public, not to compensate
aggrieved employees. ' 12 5 It is "a mechanism by which the state itself
can enforce state labor laws.' 26 The action is "brought by a group
of aggrieved employees on behalf of the State,"' 27 and the private
plaintiff acts as a "proxy or agent of the state's labor law enforce-
ment agencies."'12 8 The primary purpose of PAGA is to "achieve
maximum compliance with state labor laws"' 29 for the public bene-
fit, not to recover compensation or restitution for individual
employees. The statute is designed "to incentivize private parties to
recover civil penalties for the government that otherwise may [sic] not
have been assessed and collected by overburdened state enforce-
ment agencies' 130 by "creat[ing] a means of 'deputizing' citizens as
private attorneys general to enforce the Labor Code."
13'
The "primary beneficiary [of the action] is the public at large,
not the private individuals involved. '132 "The PAGA plaintiff has no
individual right to recovery"133 and "does not sue under PAGA to
vindicate his individual interest.1 34 Rather, the "employee plaintiff
represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law en-
forcement agencies-namely, recovery of civil penalties that
(d) It is therefore in the public interest to provide that civil penalties for violations
of the Labor Code may also be assessed and collected by aggrieved employees acting
as private attorneys general, while also ensuring that state labor law enforcement agen-
cies' enforcement actions have primacy over any private enforcement efforts
undertaken pursuant to this act.
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 note (West 2011).
125. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No. 2:ll-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114746, at *24 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 96; Franco v. Athens
Disposal Co., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1300 (2009) ("The Legislature has made clear that an
action under the PAGA is in the nature of an enforcement action ....").
126. Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 503 (2011) (emphasis added).
This is "because the employee suing under the PAGA 'does so as the proxy or agency of the
state's labor law enforcement agencies.'" Id. (citation omitted).
127. Urbino, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114746, at *21 (emphasis added).
128. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986; see also Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *12; Reyes v.
Macy's, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1123 (1st Dist. 2011).
129. See Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 980 (quoting legislative findings). The statute does not con-
tain any requirements for certification or notice.
130. Ochoa-Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc., No. C 08-2073 MHP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32774, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (emphasis added).
131. Brown, 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 501, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct 1910 (2012) (mem.).
132. Urbino, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114746, at *21.
133. Lopez v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *12 (C.D. Ca.
2012); accord Thomas v. Aetna Health of Cal., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01906-AWI-SKO, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59377, at *58 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ("Aggrieved employees have no right to seek any
individual recovery under PAGA... [they] have no separate and individual rights to pursue
under PAGA that would transform it from a law enforcement action that furthers the inter-
ests of the LWDA into a myriad of separate and distinct claims of the aggrieved employees.").
134. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70051, at *10.
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otherwise would have been assessed and collected by the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency."'' 3 5 The fact that the LWDA re-
ceives 75 percent of the recovery "only highlights the primary
public focus of a PAGA action."'3 6 "[A] ny direct financial benefit to
those harmed by the employer's unlawful conduct is ancillary to the
primary object" of the statute, which is for the private plaintiff to act
as a proxy for the LWDA and obtain a recovery on its behalf and on
behalf of all aggrieved employees.
3 7
The statute ensures that the state agency retains "primacy" over
the action.1 3 8 The plaintiff must notify the agency before com-
mencing the action, and the agency can take over the claim if it so
chooses. In this way, the statute embodies an "understanding that
labor law enforcement agencies were to retain primacy over private
enforcement efforts."'
39
C. FAA Preemption and PAGA Waivers
California employers have begun to include waivers of the ability
to proceed in a representative or private attorney general capacity
in their standardized arbitration clauses. 40 Such clauses have appar-
ently become widespread in California, particularly since
Concepcion.'4 1 For example, the provision at issue in Brown v. Ralphs
Grocery provided:
[T] here is no right or authority for any Covered Disputes to be
heard or arbitrated on a class action basis, as a private attorney
general, or on bases involving claims or disputes brought in a
representative capacity on behalf of the general public, of
other Ralphs employees (or any of them), or of other persons
alleged to be similarly situated .... [T] here are no judge or
135. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986.
136. Urbino, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114746, at *29-30.
137. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 987 n.7.
138. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 note (West 2011).
139. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 980.
140. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
141. A large empirical study concluded that, in general, corporations use mandatory arbi-
tration clauses for the primary purpose of avoiding classwide proceedings. Eisenberg et al.,
supra note 4, at 886-88. See also Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical
Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 Httv. NEGOT. L. Rv. 115, 144-50 (2010) (examining
cell phone and credit card contracts and concluding that "companies use arbitration clauses
to limit their vulnerability to consumer claims, especially class actions"); Christopher R.
Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses, 25 OHIO
ST.J. ON Dsp. RESOL. 433 (2010) (arguing that Eisenberg's conclusions should be limited to
credit card and cell phone companies).
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jury trials and there are no class actions or Representative Ac-
tions permitted under this Arbitration Policy.
142
Similarly, the clause at issue in Urbino v. Orkin Services of California,
Inc., provided that the parties "waive any right to join or consolidate
claims in arbitration with others or to make claims in arbitration as
a representative or as a member of a class or in a private attorney
general capacity."'
' 43
Brown held that such clauses are not covered by Concepcion be-
cause PAGA actions do not seek individual recoveries, but are
fundamentally law enforcement actions in which the plaintiff as-
serts the same legal right and interest as the LWDA. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 144 Other California state courts have
reached a similar result. 145 In Urbino,146 for example, the federal dis-
trict court followed Brown and held that because a contractual
PAGA waiver "contradicts the fundamental purpose of a representa-
tive enforcement action under PAGA, it is unconscionable and
unenforceable . . . because it both deprives the individual of the
right to bring a representative action and deprives the LWDA the
benefits of the enforcement action brought by aggrieved employ-
ees."1 47 Other federal district courts have also denied employers'
motions to compel arbitration of PAGA claims on reasoning similar
to Brown: that a PAGA claim is not an individual claim but is
brought as the proxy or agent of state law enforcement agencies. 48
142. Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 495 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
143. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114746, at *35 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
144. 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012). Obviously, a denial of certiorari does not mean that the
Court agreed with Brown's analysis, but it does tell us that there were not four justices who
voted to hear the case.
145. See Reyes v. Macy's, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1123 (2011).
146. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114746 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
147. Id. at *24. "The waiver clause was unconscionable because, inter alia, the provision
expressly prohibited the plaintiffs ability to collect civil penalties in a representative capacity,
thereby preventing plaintiff 'from performing the core function of a private attorney gen-
eral' and undermining the very purpose and nature of a PAGA enforcement action .. " Id.
at *35 (quoting Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1303 (2009)).
Urbino's argument that a waiver takes away an individual's right to bring a representative
action is not persuasive, at least to me; it is indistinguishable from the contention that a
mandatory arbitration clause takes away an individual's right to go to court. But see Deposit
Guar. Nat'l BankJackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (holding that the right to bring
a claim as the representative of a class is substantial enough to allow a named plaintiff to
appeal denial of class certification). The conclusion that the waiver infringes the state's own
interest is sound, however.
148. Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also supra
notes 113, 115-19. Alcantar also determined that class certification is not required for stand-
ing in PAGA cases brought in federal court, Alcantar v. Hobert Service, No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG
(SPx), 2013 WL 146323, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013); accord, Moua v. Int'l Bus. Mach.
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A number of federal court decisions, by contrast, have held that
"[a] PAGA claim is a state-law claim, and states may not exempt
claims from the FAA."' 149 Thus, the fate of PAGA under Concepcion is
not clearly established.
It should be apparent from the discussion in the preceding sec-
tion, however, that the FAA should pose no obstacle to the
application of state unconscionability law to bar pre-dispute waivers
of the right to bring a PAGA action. PAGA was enacted as a means
to augment the state's law enforcement powers to achieve "maxi-
mum compliance" with the law, and its primary purpose is to
benefit the public, not to compensate private individuals. The legis-
lature enacted PAGA on the determination that the "only
meaningful deterrent" in some cases "is the vigorous assessment
and collection of civil penalties" and that in light of budget con-
straints state law enforcement agencies "are likely to fail to keep up
with the growth of the labor market in the future."150 The private
Corp., 2012 WL 370570, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Thomas v. Aetna Health of Califor-
nia, No. 1;10-cv-01906 AWl (Sko), 2011 WL 2173715, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2011)
(surveying cases). Alcantar also rejected the argument that PAGA claims could not be tried as
representative actions in the absence of certification without violating defendants' due pro-
cess rights. Alcantar, 2013 WL 146323, at *4.
149. Luchini v. Carmax, No. CV F 12-0417 LJO DLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126230 (E.D.
Cal. 2012); see also Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 846 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) ("[T]he Court must enforce the parties' Arbitration Agreement even if this might
prevent Plaintiffs from acting as private attorneys general."); Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F.
Supp. 2d 1159, 1181 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to follow Brown and finding that PAGA
claims are arbitrable); Valle v. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No. 11-1489 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93639 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Nelson v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. C1O-4802 TEH, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92290 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Quevedo v. Macy's, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D.
Cal. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs "PAGA claim is arbitrable, and.., the arbitration agree-
ment's provision barring him from bringing that claim on behalf of other employees is
enforceable" and declining to follow Brown because preemption is a question of federal, not
state law); Hill v. Ins. Co. of the W., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40632 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (decided
before Concepcion); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 206 Cal. App. 4th 949, 966 ("Following
Concepcion, the public policy reasons underpinning the PAGA do not allow a court to disre-
gard a binding arbitration agreement. The FAA preempts any attempt by a court or state
legislature to insulate a particular type of claim from arbitration."), vacated and review granted,
2012 Cal. LEXIS 8925 (2012); cf Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass'n, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7312
(9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013) (en banc) (plaintiffs' argument that a contractual ban on class arbi-
tration was unconscionable under California law "is now expressly foreclosed by Concepcion").
A number of federal courts have held that PAGA is a procedural statute that is superseded in
federal court by Rule 23; accordingly, an individual lacks standing to recover on behalf of
non-named third parties absent class certification. See Fields v. QSP, Inc., No. CV 12-1238
CAS (PJWx), 2012 WL 2049528, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012); Ivey v. Apogen Technologies,
Inc., No. 11CV366 DMS NLS, 2011 WL 3515936, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011); Thompson
v. APM Terminals Pac. Ltd., No. C 10-00677 JSW, 2010 WL 6309364, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
26, 2010); Adams v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp., No. SA CV 07-1465 AHS (MLGx), 2009
WL 7401970, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2009). Each of these cases can be found cited in Al-
cantar, 2013 WL 146323.
150. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 note (West 2011).
SUMMER 2013] Qui Tam Actions as State Response to Concepcion 1233
plaintiff stands in the shoes of the state, to enforce a claim belong-
ing to the state, and the state agency retains primacy over the
litigation.
As the court held in Brown, " [i]f the FAA preempted state law as
to the unenforceability of the PAGA representative action waivers,
the benefits of private attorney general actions to enforce state la-
bor laws would, in large part, be nullified."'' 51 It is difficult to see
how a private individual could contract away the state's right to en-
force its law. This is what Brown meant in saying that Concepcion does
not hold that a public right (a right belonging to the public) may be
contractually waived by a private individual if such a waiver is con-
trary to state law. If the agency were suing in its own name, it would
clearly have the power to retain outside counsel to conduct the liti-
gation. PAGA is functionally a means of doing the same thing.
Allowing private employers to nullify the legislature's chosen means
of enforcing the labor code by inserting mandatory waiver provi-
sions in contracts of adhesion would seriously impair the state's
ability to perform a core governmental function. For that reason,
extending Concepcion to allow mandatory waivers of PAGA actions
should raise grave federalism concerns.
It is even unclear whether mandatory arbitration clauses should
be enforceable in PAGA actions. If PAGA-style actions assert the
state's own rights and are for the benefit of the state, then such a
statute should be able to bar not only class waivers but also litiga-
tion waivers-just as a state could refuse to arbitrate a lawsuit
brought directly by the state to collect a civil penalty. Certainly, pri-
vate parties could not, through a private contract, waive or destroy
the state's right to bring an enforcement action in court. Neither
the text of the FAA nor the Supreme Court's previous cases have
suggested that the FAA should be interpreted to invade state sover-
eign interests to this extent.
To be sure, the majority in Concepcion responded to Justice
Breyer's concern that without classwide proceedings small claims
might "slip through the legal system" by saying, " [b] ut States cannot
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is
desirable for unrelated reasons."'52 Here, however, the private attor-
ney general or qui tam action is not inconsistent with the FAA
because it is a mechanism for prosecuting claims belonging to the
state, not to the contracting private parties.
Some courts have assumed, without much reflection, that be-
cause the FAA requires enforcement of mandatory arbitration
151. Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 502 (2011).
152. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2012).
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clauses generally, the same would be true for PAGA claims. The
argument is that the employee has agreed to submit any dispute
arising from the employment relationship to arbitration, and this
includes PAGA claims. On the other hand, a PAGA plaintiff is as-
serting a claim belonging to the state, on behalf of the state. In an
enforcement action by the state agency, the agency would have the
absolute right to decline arbitration and go to court. Why should a
private individual be able to make this choice for the state, and in a
contract of adhesion no less?
Yet even if a mandatory arbitration clause can require PAGA
claims to be resolved through arbitration, there is no reason why
Concepcion should require enforcement of outright waivers of the
right to bring PAGA claims in any forum. As Brown reasoned, this
would nullify an important interest-and right-of the state.
153 It
would thus be an unreasonable intrusion on state autonomy and
sovereignty.
D. Drafting a Qui Tam or Private Attorney General Statute for
Contracts of Adhesion
A statute similar to PAGA that created a mechanism for private
plaintiffs to sue to enforce statutory penalties in a qui tam action
could offer a way for states to obtain private enforcement of state
law in standardized transactions involving harm to large numbers of
people, even when defendants could avoid traditional class action
litigation through mandatory arbitration clauses containing class
waivers.
PAGA applies only to statutory penalties prescribed for violations
of the state labor code, but a similar mechanism could be added to
consumer protection laws. For example, California's Consumer Le-
gal Remedies Act 154 outlaws a long list of "unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in transac-
tions involving the sale of goods or services to consumers155 and
authorizes "any consumer who suffers any damage as a result" of
such practices to sue for actual and punitive damages, restitution,
and injunctive relief. 156 The statute could be amended to provide a
statutory penalty for violations and to authorize private attorney
153. Brown, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 501; see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 2009).
155. Id. § 1770 (a).
156. Id. § 1780(a). Senior citizens and disabled persons may be entitled to an additional
$5,000. § 1780(b).
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general or qui tam actions similar to those in PAGA. Statutes regu-
lating unfair competition, insurance, environmental protection,
and other subjects where contracts of adhesion are common could
be similarly amended.
The preceding discussion of PAGA highlights features that
should be included in any such statute. The statute should contain
a civil penalty, enforceable by a state agency and payable to the
state. Private plaintiffs who suffer injury sufficient to confer stand-
ing1 57 should be authorized to bring qui tam or private attorney
general actions to recover those penalties for the state, retaining a
share of the recovery as an incentive (or bounty) to encourage en-
forcement. The statute should make it clear that the legal right
belongs to the state; the purpose of the statute is to augment en-
forcement by the state agency; the private plaintiff acts for the
benefit of the state and the public; and the primary purpose of the
provision is for the benefit of the public, not for private benefit. For
general policy reasons, the state agency charged with enforcement
of the statute should receive pre-filing notice of any intended ac-
tion and should be given the opportunity to take over the
investigation and prosecution.
Some additional tweaks and improvements might be suggested.
For example, PAGA states that the plaintiff brings the action "on
behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employ-
ees." A crisper formulation would be that of Urbino: "on behalf of
the State." That is to say, framing the statute more clearly as a tradi-
tional qui tam provision in which recovery goes to the state with an
incentive share to the plaintiff, rather than as a private attorney
general action in which a private plaintiff stands in the shoes of the
state as parens patriae representing a group, would draw a clearer
distinction between the qui tam proceeding to recover the state's
claim and a class action to recover the individual claims of a group
of people. Making this distinction clearer would make it more likely
that a court would find Concepcion inapplicable.
In the same vein, the statute should make it quite clear that the
action is not brought as an aggregation of individual claims. In a qui
tam action under the FCA, the recovery goes to the government,
with a share going to the relator. PAGA provides, however, that the
"civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distrib-
uted" 75 percent to the state agency and 25 percent "to the
157. Standing requirements may be more lenient in state courts than in federal court, but
a requirement that the plaintiff have been subjected to the defendant's violation would pro-
vide a nexus between the plaintiff and the enforcement action. The statutory incentive award
should be sufficient to satisfy federal standing requirements in the case of removal.
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aggrieved employees." ' This language creates the possibility of
confusion over whether PAGA actions are brought to recover indi-
vidual claims for compensation, though case law makes it clear that
this amount is for the affected employees "as a whole" or as a
group. 159 The possibility for such confusion could be avoided by
making the incentive share of the statutory penalty payable to the
plaintiff, as the FCA provides, rather than "to the aggrieved
employees."
On the other hand, the drafters of PAGA probably thought that
it was in the public interest to assure that aggrieved employees re-
ceive some monetary benefit from the lawsuit. Taking this view, the
statute could award a share of the penalties to the group affected by
the misconduct but should make it clear that the award is not com-
pensation for individual claims and is awarded to the group as a
whole. 160
A third set of issues involves the amount of the statutory penalty
and the percentage of the recovery to be designated as an incentive
payment to the plaintiff. It might not be necessary to set the incen-
tive as high as PAGA's 25 percent if the statute also provides, as
PAGA does, for attorneys' fees and costs. However, just as the FCA
bounty encourages private plaintiffs to initiate proceedings, a signif-
icant bounty could encourage enforcement.
Whether a significant share of the penalties should go to absent
members of the group, as well as whether a particular level of statu-
tory penalty is "too large," may depend on how likely it is that
defendants will face claims for both the statutory penalties and
compensatory awards for aggrieved individuals. Concepcion effec-
tively eliminates the possibility of class actions in cases where savvy
defendants write the governing contracts, and the Concepcion major-
ity's assertion that the provisions of the contract make it likely that a
significant number of affected persons will pursue their claims in
158. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (West 2011).
159. Presumably the plaintiff is responsible for distributing this sum, though court ap-
proval of the distribution apparently is not necessary. See Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th
969 (2009) (holding PAGA actions need not meet the procedural requirements for class
actions).
160. It would probably be wise to give some guidance about how the recovery should be
allocated and distributed. It is also possible that if a single plaintiff could bring both a private
attorney general claim and a class action over the same conduct, as was the case in California
before Concepcion, the fact that the named plaintiff would receive all of the incentive share in
the qui tam action, but the class recovery would have to be distributed to the class subject to
court approval, might create a conflict of interest. See Nordstrom Comm'n Cases, 186 Cal
App 4th 576 (2010) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving a
settlement that did not allocate any damages to the class's civil penalty claims under the
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004; such claims were resolved as a part of the overall
settlement of the case).
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arbitration is touchingly naive.161 If Concepcion means, as Justice Ste-
vens argued, that there will be virtually no individual enforcement
because bilateral arbitration is not feasible for most people, then
the only practical chance affected group members will have of re-
covering any money will be through a private attorney general
action. In these circumstances, a legislature would be justified in
allocating a significant share of the penalty to the group as a whole
in order to provide some chance of recovery for those injured by
defendant's illegal conduct. Similarly, if it is unlikely that many
members of the group will be pursuing individual claims, then
there need be little concern that statutory penalties imposed sepa-
rately from individual claims for compensation will result in too
much deterrence.
Because the statutory penalty is lower than compensatory dam-
ages would be for many labor violations, awards in PAGA-style
actions to recover statutory penalties may be smaller than they
would be in class actions for similar violations. In one case that in-
cluded both class claims and PAGA claims, for example, the
penalties awarded under PAGA were less than one-third of the com-
pensatory damages awarded to the class. 62 Before Concepcion, PAGA
claims were generally brought together with class claims. One can
expect that after Concepcion and Wal-Mart v. Dukes, many cases
where PAGA applies will not be maintainable as class actions, either
because plaintiffs cannot meet the more stringent commonality re-
quirement of Wal-Mart and its new requirement that class actions
seeking back pay be certified as (b) (3) classes, or because the em-
ployment contract contains an arbitration provision with a class
waiver. Therefore, the total recoverable amount, and thus the de-
terrent effect, in such actions will likely be lower after these recent
decisions.
Most class actions that are certified, however, are resolved by set-
tlement. Courts might award, and plaintiffs might collect, a greater
161. If the defendant simply tenders to anyone who seriously threatens to pursue arbitra-
tion the value of the claim ($30.22 in Concepcion), it will not have to pay either the $7,500
penalty or the claimant's attorneys' fees. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. Information asymme-
tries guarantee that few consumers will even realize that they may have a claim, and any
competent attorney will realize that there is no economic future in representing individuals
in bilateral arbitration proceedings for $30 claims. Thus, the class waiver allows the defen-
dant to avoid all but de minimis costs of its illegal behavior. In Judge Posner's memorable
phrase, "The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30." Carnegie, 376 F. 3d at 661 (quoted
in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
162. Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1174 (Cal. App. 3d 2008)
(approximately $800,000 recovered for damages to the class and $250,000 in civil penalties
under PAGA).
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proportion of potential recoveries in PAGA-type actions than is the
norm in class action settlements, and therefore cases might also set-
tle for a higher percentage of the potential recovery. The cases
might be easier to prove than common law claims, for example.
More streamlined proof, the lack of extended litigation over class
certification, and the emergence of a small specialized bar litigating
under the statute might even lead to a higher trial rate than for
consumer class actions, and more trials could lead to higher settle-
ment values. 63 Additionally, if class actions prove to be no longer
feasible and individual enforcement through arbitration does not
provide sufficient deterrence in the legislature's judgment, the leg-
islature can adjust the amount of the statutory penalty to achieve
the desired level of deterrence.
In calibrating the amount of the penalty, the legislature has two
variables to work with. The size of the penalty (under PAGA, $50,
$100 or $200 per violation) should be based on deterrence-will a
particular amount be too low to deter unlawful behavior or too
high to be fair in light of the number of claims that could be raised?
The legislature should consider the fact that the statutory penalty
will be in addition to individuals' right to recover compensatory
damages. But in situations where, after Concepcion, it is unlikely that
class actions can be brought because waivers will be enforceable
and unlikely that much will be recovered through individual arbi-
tration because of the small amount of the claim, asymmetrical
information, and the transaction costs of pursuing a claim, the leg-
islature may conclude that the statutory penalty will be the primary
means of deterrence and could decide to set the penalty at a higher
amount.
The size of the plaintiff's share of the recovery (under PAGA, 25
percent), by contrast, should be determined by the incentive effect
desired. How much of an incentive is necessary to encourage pri-
vate enforcement, and how much would amount to an unfair
windfall for a single individual and thereby perhaps encourage too
much litigation? In statutes like PAGA that contain an attorneys'
fees provision, the percentage of the award going to the plaintiff
could be relatively small because attorneys' fees might be enough
incentive to attract lawyers to bring the claims, as in civil rights cases
where compensatory damages are often small or nonexistent but
attorneys' fees assure that representation is available.
163. See, e.g.,Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlements of Securi-
ties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of the Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EmNp, mcA LEGAL
STUD. 459 (2004).
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In any event, such judgments, including the question of how
likely it is that large numbers of individuals will pursue claims in
arbitration, are quintessentially legislative, not judicial, in nature,
and courts should defer to the legislature's judgment.
CONCLUSION
Concepcion makes it possible for corporations to avoid being sued
in class actions for any claim arising out of a transaction involving a
standard-form contract-that is to say, for almost all consumer and
employment claims. Restoring effective enforcement through legis-
lation would be challenging. Federal legislation to prohibit class
waivers in consumer and employment contracts of adhesion could
be effective but is unlikely to be politically feasible. State legislation
would be more politically feasible, but the Supremacy Clause makes
it virtually impossible to draft a bill that would be effective. Creating
statutory civil penalties for violations of consumer protection and
employment laws, together with a qui tam mechanism to permit pri-
vate enforcement of those penalties, offers an unorthodox but
possibly fruitful alternative to achieving the deterrent effect of class
proceedings. Qui tam actions are not a perfect substitute for class
actions, of course, because they can fulfill the compensatory func-
tion of class actions only to a limited extent. But they may partially
fill the deterrence gap that Concepcion is widely expected to create.
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APPENDIX
CALIFORNIA PRIVATE ATroRNEys GENERAL ACT
CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE §§ 2698 ET SEQ.
§ 2698. Citation of part.
This part shall be known and may be cited as the Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.
§ 2699. Recovery of civil penalty for violation of Labor Code
through civil action brought by aggrieved employee; Amount of
penalty; Attorney's fees and costs; Distribution of penalty proceeds;
Applicability of section.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of
this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and col-
lected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or any of
its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or em-
ployees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be
recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee
on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employ-
ees pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3.
(b) For purposes of this part, "person" has the same meaning as
defined in Section 18.
(c) For purposes of this part, "aggrieved employee" means any
person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom
one or more of the alleged violations was committed.
(d) For purposes of this part, "cure" means that the employer
abates each violation alleged by any aggrieved employee, the em-
ployer is in compliance with the underlying statutes as specified in
the notice required by this part, and any aggrieved employee is
made whole.
(e)
(1) For purposes of this part, whenever the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency, or any of its departments, divi-
sions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, has
discretion to assess a civil penalty, a court is authorized to exer-
cise the same discretion, subject to the same limitations and
conditions, to assess a civil penalty.
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(2) In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery
of a civil penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court
may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty
amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an
award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.
(f) For all provisions of this code except those for which a civil
penalty is specifically provided, there is established a civil penalty
for a violation of these provisions, as follows:
(1) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person does not
employ one or more employees, the civil penalty is five hundred
dollars ($500).
(2) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person employs
one or more employees, the civil penalty is one hundred dollars
($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial
violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each aggrieved em-
ployee per pay period for each subsequent violation.
(3) If the alleged violation is a failure to act by the Labor and
Workplace Development Agency, or any of its departments, divi-
sions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, there shall
be no civil penalty.
(g)
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an aggrieved em-
ployee may recover the civil penalty described in subdivision (f)
in a civil action pursuant to the procedures specified in Section
2699.3 filed on behalf of himself or herself and other current or
former employees against whom one or more of the alleged vio-
lations was committed. Any employee who prevails in any action
shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs. Nothing in this part shall operate to limit an employee's
right to pursue or recover other remedies available under state
or federal law, either separately or concurrently with an action
taken under this part.
(2) No action shall be brought under this part for any viola-
tion of a posting, notice, agency reporting, or filing requirement
of this code, except where the filing or reporting requirement
involves mandatory payroll or workplace injury reporting.
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(h) No action may be brought under this section by an aggrieved
employee if the agency or any of its departments, divisions, commis-
sions, boards, agencies, or employees, on the same facts and
theories, cites a person within the timeframes set forth in Section
2699.3 for a violation of the same section or sections of the Labor
Code under which the aggrieved employee is attempting to recover
a civil penalty on behalf of himself or herself or others or initiates a
proceeding pursuant to Section 98.3.
(i) Except as provided in subdivision (j), civil penalties recovered
by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to
the Labor and Workforce Development Agency for enforcement of
labor laws and education of employers and employees about their
rights and responsibilities under this code, to be continuously ap-
propriated to supplement and not supplant the funding to the
agency for those purposes; and 25 percent to the aggrieved
employees.
(j) Civil penalties recovered under paragraph (1) of subdivision
(f) shall be distributed to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency for enforcement of labor laws and education of employers
and employees about their rights and responsibilities under this
code, to be continuously appropriated to supplement and not sup-
plant the funding to the agency for those purposes.
(k) Nothing contained in this part is intended to alter or other-
wise affect the exclusive remedy provided by the workers'
compensation provisions of this code for liability against an em-
ployer for the compensation for any injury to or death of an
employee arising out of and in the course of employment.
(1) The superior court shall review and approve any penalties
sought as part of a proposed settlement agreement pursuant to this
part.
(m) This section shall not apply to the recovery of administrative
and civil penalties in connection with the workers' compensation
law as contained in Division 1 (commencing with Section 50) and
Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200), including, but not lim-
ited to, Sections 129.5 and 132a.
(n) The agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions,
boards, or agencies may promulgate regulations to implement the
provisions of this part.
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Note
Stats 2003 ch 906 provides:
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the
following:
(a) Adequate financing of essential labor law enforcement func-
tions is necessary to achieve maximum compliance with state labor
laws in the underground economy and to ensure an effective disin-
centive for employers to engage in unlawful and anticompetitive
business practices.
(b) Although innovative labor law education programs and self-
policing efforts by industry watchdog groups may have some success
in educating some employers about their obligations under state
labor laws, in other cases the only meaningful deterrent to unlawful
conduct is the vigorous assessment and collection of civil penalties
as provided in the Labor Code.
(c) Staffing levels for state labor law enforcement agencies have,
in general, declined over the last decade and are likely to fail to
keep up with the growth of the labor market in the future.
(d) It is therefore in the public interest to provide that civil pen-
alties for violations of the Labor Code may also be assessed and
collected by aggrieved employees acting as private attorneys gen-
eral, while also ensuring that state labor law enforcement agencies'
enforcement actions have primacy over any private enforcement ef-
forts undertaken pursuant to this act.
§ 2699.3. Requirements for commencement of civil actions
under Lab C 13 2699 alleging specified violations; Time limits.
(a) A civil action by-an aggrieved employee pursuant to subdivi-
sion (a) or (f) of Section 2699 alleging a violation of any provision
listed in Section 2699.5 shall commence only after the following
requirements have been met:
(1) The aggrieved employee or representative shall give writ-
ten notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency and the employer of the specific provisions
of this code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and
theories to support the alleged violation.
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(A) The agency shall notify the employer and the aggrieved
employee or representative by certified mail that it does not
intend to investigate the alleged violation within 30 calendar
days of the postmark date of the notice received pursuant to
paragraph (1). Upon receipt of that notice or if no notice is
provided within 33 calendar days of the postmark date of the
notice given pursuant to paragraph (1), the aggrieved em-
ployee may commence a civil action pursuant to Section 2699.
(B) If the agency intends to investigate the alleged violation,
it shall notify the employer and the aggrieved employee or
representative by certified mail of its decision within 33 calen-
dar days of the postmark date of the notice received pursuant
to paragraph (1). Within 120 calendar days of that decision,
the agency may investigate the alleged violation and issue any
appropriate citation. If the agency determines that no citation
will be issued, it shall notify the employer and aggrieved em-
ployee of that decision within five business days thereof by
certified mail. Upon receipt of that notice or if no citation is
issued by the agency within the 158-day period prescribed by
subparagraph (A) and this subparagraph or if the agency fails
to provide timely or any notification, the aggrieved employee
may commence a civil action pursuant to Section 2699.
(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a plaintiff
may as a matter of right amend an existing complaint to add a
cause of action arising under this part at any time within 60
days of the time periods specified in this part.
(b) A civil action by an aggrieved employee pursuant to subdivi-
sion (a) or (f) of Section 2699 alleging a violation of any provision
of Division 5 (commencing with Section 6300) other than those
listed in Section 2699.5 shall commence only after the following
requirements have been met:
(1) The aggrieved employee or representative shall give notice
by certified mail to the Division of Occupational Safety and
Health and the employer, with a copy to the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency, of the specific provisions of Di-
vision 5 (commencing with Section 6300) alleged to have been
violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged
violation.
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(A) The division shall inspect or investigate the alleged vio-
lation pursuant to the procedures specified in Division 5
(commencing with Section 6300).
(i) If the division issues a citation, the employee may not
commence an action pursuant to Section 2699. The division
shall notify the aggrieved employee and employer in writing
within 14 calendar days of certifying that the employer has
corrected the violation.
(ii) If by the end of the period for inspection or investiga-
tion provided for in Section 6317, the division fails to issue a
citation and the aggrieved employee disputes that decision,
the employee may challenge that decision in the superior
court. In such an action, the superior court shall follow
precedents of the Occupational Safety and Health Appeals
Board. If the court finds that the division should have issued
a citation and orders the division to issue a citation, then
the aggrieved employee may not commence a civil action
pursuant to Section 2699.
(iii) A complaint in superior court alleging a violation of
Division 5 (commencing with Section 6300) other than
those listed in Section 2699.5 shall include therewith a copy
of the notice of violation provided to the division and em-
ployer pursuant to paragraph (1).
(iv) The superior court shall not dismiss the action for
nonmaterial differences in facts or theories between those
contained in the notice of violation provided to the division
and employer pursuant to paragraph (1) and the complaint
filed with the court.
(B) If the division fails to inspect or investigate the alleged
violation as provided by Section 6309, the provisions of subdi-
vision (c) shall apply to the determination of the alleged
violation.
(3)
(A) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to alter
the authority of the division to permit long-term abatement
periods or to enter into memoranda of understanding or joint
agreements with employers in the case of long-term abatement
issues.
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(B) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to au-
thorize an employee to file a notice or to commence a civil
action pursuant to Section 2699 during the period that an em-
ployer has voluntarily entered into consultation with the
division to ameliorate a condition in that particular worksite.
(C) An employer who has been provided notice pursuant to
this section may not then enter into consultation with the divi-
sion in order to avoid an action under this section.
(4) The superior court shall review and approve any proposed
settlement of alleged violations of the provisions of Division 5
(commencing with Section 6300) to ensure that the settlement
provisions are at least as effective as the protections or remedies
provided by state and federal law or regulation for the alleged
violation. The provisions of the settlement relating to health and
safety laws shall be submitted to the division at the same time that
they are submitted to the court. This requirement shall be con-
strued to authorize and permit the division to comment on those
settlement provisions, and the court shall grant the division's
commentary the appropriate weight.
(c) A civil action by an aggrieved employee pursuant to subdivi-
sion (a) or (f) of Section 2699 alleging a violation of any provision
other than those listed in Section 2699.5 or Division 5 (commenc-
ing with Section 6300) shall commence only after the following
requirements have been met:
(1) The aggrieved employee or representative shall give writ-
ten notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency and the employer of the specific provisions
of this code alleged to have been violated, includihg the facts and
theories to support the alleged violation.
(2)
(A) The employer may cure the alleged violation within 33
calendar days of the postmark date of the notice. The em-
ployer shall give written notice by certified mail within that
period of time to the aggrieved employee or representative
and the agency if the alleged violation is cured, including a
description of actions taken, and no civil action pursuant to
Section 2699 may commence. If the alleged violation is not
cured within the 33-day period, the employee may commence
a civil action pursuant to Section 2699.
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(B) No employer may avail himself or herself of the notice
and cure provisions of this subdivision more than three times
in a 12-month period for the same violation or violations con-
tained in the notice, regardless of the location of the worksite.
(3) If the aggrieved employee disputes that the alleged viola-
tion has been cured, the aggrieved employee or representative
shall provide written notice by certified mail, including specified
grounds to support that dispute, to the employer and the agency.
Within 17 calendar days of the postmark date of that notice, the
agency shall review the actions taken by the employer to cure the
alleged violation, and provide written notice of its decision by
certified mail to the aggrieved employee and the employer. The
agency may grant the employer three additional business days to
cure the alleged violation. If the agency determines that the al-
leged violation has not been cured or if the agency fails to
provide timely or any notification, the employee may proceed
with the civil action pursuant to Section 2699. If the agency de-
termines that the alleged violation has been cured, but the
employee still disagrees, the employee may appeal that determi-
nation to the superior court.
(d) The periods specified in this section are not counted as part
of the time limited for the commencement of the civil action to
recover penalties under this part.
Note
Stats 2004 ch 221 provides:
SEC. 7. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision
of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not
affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect with-
out the invalid provision or application.
